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CHAPTER 15 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD C. HUBERo 
§15.1. Zoning-Section 6 Pl"Otection-Time of Filing an Application 
for a Building Pennit. Section 6 of the new Zoning Act 1 provides for 
a protection or zoning freeze period of three years, running from the 
date of a local planning board's endorsement that a plan does not re-
quire approval under the Subdivision Control Law.2 During this period, 
the use of the land shown on such a plan is governed by the applicable 
provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-law in effect at the time of 
the submission of the plan, rather than by any subsequent amendments 
enacted prior to the developer's application for a building permit.s 
Therefore, a developer's seasonable application for a building permit 
may not be denied on the grounds that the proposed use is prohibited 
under the new ordinance or by-law. 
° RICHARD C. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School. The author acknowledges with gratitude the extensive work of his research 
assistant, Patrick O'Mally, a second year student at Boston College Law School, 
in the preparation and writing of this chapter. 
§I5.1. 1 C.L. c. 4OA, § 6. 
2 Id. This section provides, in pertinent part: 
When a plan referred to [in] section eighty-one P of ohapter forty-one has 
been submitted to a planning board and written notice of such submission has 
been given to the city or town clerk, the use of the land shown on such a plan 
shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-
law in effect at the time of the submission of such plan while such plan is 
being processed under the subdivision control law including the time required 
to jursue or await the determination of an appeal referred to in said section, 
an for a period of three years from the date of endorsement by the planning 
board that approval under the subdivision control law is not required, or words 
of similar import. 
Id. The Subdivision Control Law, C.L. c. 41, §§ 81K-81GG, requires that any 
plan for proposed subdivisions of land in any city or town where the Subdivision 
Control Law is in effect must be submitted to and approved by the planning board 
of such city or town. C.L. c. 41, § 810. Chapter 40A, § 6, quoted above, applies 
to plans which do not propose subdivisions and which are excluded from the 
general requirements of approval. Section 81P prOvides that such excluded plans 
must be submitted to the planning board for an endorsement that approval is not 
required. Id. For a discussion of the new Zoning Act, see Huber, Zoning and 
Land Use, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 15.1-15.10, at 449-91. 
8 C.L. c. 40A, § 6. For text see note 2 supra. 
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During the Survey year, the Appeals Court clarified the actions a 
developer must take within the three-year period in order to avail 
himself of section 6 protection. In Falcone v. Zoning Board of Appeals 
of Brockton,4 the landowner plaintiff applied for endorsement of a plan 
that he believed did not require approval under the Subdivision Control 
Law.5 The zoning board so endorsed the plan on April 13, 1973.6 Sub-
sequently, on November 24, 1975, the city enacted a flood plain ordi-
nance whereby a portion of the landowner's property came within a 
"Major Importance" sub-district.7 On April 12, 1976, one day before 
the expiration of the three-year protection period, the plaintiff applied 
for a permit to build thirty-five multi-family apartment buildings.s No 
attempt was made to comply with the provisions of the flood plain ordi-
nance, although 78 of the proposed 210 units would lie within the 
"Major Importance" sub-district.9 On May 14, 1976, the city denied the 
application for failure to comply with the requirements of that ordi-
nance.10 The plaintiff appealed the denial to the zoning board of ap-
peals, contending that section 6 protected him against application of 
the flood plain ordinance.ll The board affirmed the denial on the basis 
that the protection period had expired by the time the application was 
denied.12 The plaintiff then filed an appeal from the denial of the 
building permit to the superior court, which in turn affirmed the deniaP3 
The plaintiff appealed the judgment to the Appeals Court.14 
The issue before the court was whether the mere filing of a building 
permit application within the three-year period is sufficient to assure 
the developer of section 6 protection.15 In resolving this issue, the court 
examined applicable prior case law HI and considered itself faced with 
4 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1149, 389 N.E.2d 1032. 
5 ld. at 1149, 389 N.E.2d at 1032. 
6 ld. at 1150, 389 N.E.2d at 1032. 
7 ld. The Court does not discuss a "Major Importance" subdistrict as it is 
defined under the Brockton zoning law. 
SId. 
old. 
10 ld. Although on May 29, 1973, the property was rezoned to permit only 
single family residential uses, the city did not rely on this change as a basis for 
denying the plaintiffs building application. The parties agreed that had the plain-
tiff not sought to build on that portion of the property within the "Major Im-
portance" sub-district, the application would not have been denied. ld. at n.!. 
11 ld. at 1150, 389 N.E.2d at 1033. 
12 ld. at 1150-51, 389 N.E.2d at 1033. 
18 ld. at 1149, 1151, 389 N.E.2d at 1032, 1033. 
14 ld. at 1149, 389 N.E.2d at 1032. 
15 ld. at 1152, 389 N.E.2d at 1033. 
16 ld. at 1151-52, 389 N.E.2d at 1033. In so dOing, the Court considered cases 
concerned with certain provisions of former C.L. c. 40A, § 7 A, the section from 
which the current § 6 is drawn. The language in both sections is identical in all 
material respects. 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1150 & n.2, 1151, 389 N.E.2d 
at 1003 & n.2. 
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apparently conflicting dicta 1 j from the cases of Green v. Board of Ap-
peal of Norwood 18 and Cape Ann Land Development Corp. v. Glou-
cester.19 In Green, a developer's application for a building pennit, sub-
mitted fourteen months prior to the expiration of the statutory protec-
tion period then in effect, was not denied by local officials until more 
than a year after the protection period had expired.20 In that case, the 
appeals court held that the protection afforded by the statute could not 
be lost through a local official's inaction. 21 In addition, the Court stated, 
by way of dictum, that "the period of protection provided for in § 7 A 
[extends] to building permit applications filed, but not approved, be-
fore the expiration of the period of protection provided therein." 22 In 
Cape Ann, decided two years later, the plaintifFs application for a build-
ing pennit was denied, and the plaintiff appealed.23 Although the running 
of the zoning freeze period was not in issue, the Supreme Judicial Court 
acknowledged, in dictum, that the running of the three-year period of 
the zoning freeze would be suspended from the time the pennit was 
denied, until the "disposition of all bona fide appeals." 24 The Cape 
Ann Court did not address the holding of Green, but left open the pos-
sibility that "in particular circumstances (such as where the denial is 
unreasonably delayed), the running of the statutory period may be 
suspended at a date earlier than the date on which a building pennit 
is denied." 25 
Faced with these apparently conflicting dicta, the Appeals Court 
adopted what it deemed the Cape Ann position, and held that the mere 
filing of a pennit application does not toll the running of the protection 
17 ld. at 1152, 389 N.E.2d at 1033. 
18 2 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 313 N.E.2d 451 (1974). 
19 371 Mass. 19, 353 N.E.2d 645 (1976). For a discussion of Cape Ann, see 
Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.6, at 322-25. 
20 2 Mass. App. Ct. at 394-95, 313 N.E.2d at 452-53. 
21 ld. at 396, 313 N.E.2d at 454. 
22 ld. at 396-97, 313 N.E.2d at 454, quoted in 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
1152, 389 N.E.2d at 1033-34. 
23 371 Mass. at 21, 353 N.E.2d at 646. 
24 ld. at 23 n.5, 353 N.E.2d at 647 n.5. 
25 ld., quoted in 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1153, 389 N.E.2d at 1034. 
The Falcone Court does not explain why it finds these two statements to be con-
flicting; nor does it emphasize that Green is a decision of the Appeals Court, and 
Cape Ann is a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court. The Falcone Court ap-
parently understood the Green opinion to hold that an application filed at any time 
within the three year period is protected by the zoning freeze. In contrast, the 
court interpreted the quoted Cape Ann dictum to indicate that, except for the pos-
sibility of special circumstances, any suspension for tolling of the statutory period 
could begin only after a denial of the application. Hence, only an application 
which was received and acted upon prior to the end of the three year period would 
be eligible to take advantage of the § 6 freeze period. In the case of a denial, the 
period would be tolled until for appeals. 
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period.26 The court emphasized that the plaintiff, by not applying for 
a permit until the last day before the protection period expired, had 
made it impossible to secure the approvals necessary for the issuance 
of the permit before the expiration date.27 Therefore, the plaintiff's 
application was not entitled to the protection of the section 6 zoning 
freeze. Without that protection, the plaintiff had to bear the risk of 
subsequent zoning changes, and his application would be controlled by 
the zoning ordinance in effect at the time of the decision on the appli-
cation.28 
Falcone represents a limitation upon the protection afforded by sec-
tion 6.29 The decision unequivocally holds that in normal circumstances 
the developer must complete the application process within the three-
year period. The mere filing of an application within that period is not 
always sufficient to assure protection against changes in the zoning laws. 
Section 6 will not protect a developer unless he has given the local 
authorities a reasonable time to act upon his application before the 
period expires. Hence, the effect of Falcone is to allow a developer 
actually less than the statutorily prescribed three years, in which to file 
his application. 
The decision reflects a basic preference in these circumstances for the 
community interest over the interests of the private landowner. While 
acknowledging that section 6 was designed to protect a developer dur-
ing the planning stages of a building project 30 the Court's application 
of the statute runs counter to the interests of the developer. The deci-
sion suggests that the court considers it the responsibility of the devel-
oper to protect his own interests, and the protection afforded by section 
6 will not be extended to accommodate him. Furthermore, the statutory 
provision represents a modification of zoning policy determined by the 
local community. Since such exceptions have traditionally been nar-
rowly construed by courts, the court's decision in Falcone follows that 
tradition of protecting the community's right to determine its own poli-
cies with a minimum of interference from state law. 
§15.2. Zoning-Regulation of Religious and Educational Uses. In 
a very interesting case that arose during the Survey year, the Appeals 
Court was required to examine the extent to which a municipality may 
regulate the uses of property owned or leased by a religious sect or 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1153, 389 N.E.2d at 1034. 
27 Id. at 1154, 389 N.E.2d at 1034. 
28 See id. 
29 For text of § 6 see note 2 supra. 
30 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1151, 389 N.E.2d at 1033 (citing McCarthy 
v. Board of Appeals of Ashland, 354 Mass. 660, 663, 241 N .E.2d 840, 843 (1968); 
Nyquist v. Board of Appeals of Acton, 359 Mass. 462, 465, 269 N.E.2d 654, 656 
(1971). 
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denomination. Under section 3 of the new Zoning Act,! land or struc-
tures used for educational or religious purposes are exempt from zoning 
ordinances or by-laws that would effectively prohibit or limit such uses.2 
These uses are not, however, totally exempt from all local regulation. 
Section 3 explicitly provides that religiOUS or educational uses may be 
subject to reasonable regulations concerning bulk, dimensional, and 
parking requirements.s In The Bible Speaks v. Board of Appeals of 
Lenox,4 the Appeals Court clarified the limitations on muniCipal regula-
tion inherent in that section. 
The town of Lenox, at its annual town meeting of May 7, 1976, ac-
cepted the provisions of the new Zoning Act and also amended its 
zoning by-law to include a section covering religious and educational 
uses.1I As amended, the by-laws provided that all new religiOUS and 
educational uses in residential districts, or changes in such uses, would 
be permitted only upon obtaining a special permit granted at the dis-
cretion of the zoning board of appeals.6 In conjunction with the appli-
cation for a special permit, the religiOUS or educational institution seek-
ing the permit was required to submit a precise site plan, accompanied 
by an informational statement detailing the probable impact of the pro-
posed use upon the character of the particular neighborhood involved.7 
Additionally, the proposed use was required to meet certain access and 
dimensional requirements.s 
The case came to the Appeals Court as a consolidation of five separate 
actions instituted by The Bible Speaks, a non-profit religious and educa-
tional corporation, which conducts a bona fide educational enterprise 
on its campus in Lenox.9 All five actions involved applications filed 
subsequent to the town's acceptance of the new Zoning Act, but prior 
to June 30, 1978.10 In three of the actions, the plaintiff had applied for 
§15.2. 1 C.L. c. 4OA, § 3. 
2 ld. Section 3 provides in pertinent part: 
[Nlor shall any such ordinance or by-law prohibit, regulate or restrict the use 
of land or struotures for religious purposes or for educational purposes on land 
owned or leased by . . . a religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit 
educational corporation; provided, however, that such land or structures may 
be subject to reasonable regulations concerning the bulk and height of struc-
tures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space, parking and 
building coverage requirements. 
For a discussion of the new Zoning Act, see Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1976 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 15.1-15.10, at 449-91. 
3 C.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
4 1979 Mass. App. Gt. Adv. Sh. 1362, 391 N.E.2d 279. 
II ld. at 1364, 391 N.E.2d at 280. 
6 ld. at 1364-65 & n.6, 391 N.E.2d at 280-81 & n.6. 
7 ld. at 1364 n.5, 391 N.E.2d at 280 n.5. 
SId. 
9 ld. at 1363-68 & n.4, 391 N.E.2d at 280-82 & n.4. 
10 ld. at 1364-67, 391 N.E.2d at 280-82. 
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and had been granted special permits to change the use of three of its 
buildings.ll These special permits were granted, however, subject to 
the plaintiffs compliance with specific conditions affecting the use of 
the three existing buildings involved. The permits also contained 
general conditions which affected the plaintiff's general educational 
activities and which were unrelated to the three buildings for which 
the change of use was sought.12 The plaintiff thereafter filed a com-
plaint in superior court seeking relief from the general conditions 
imposed on all three change of use permits.13 The remaining two actions 
resulted from the building inspector's denial of the plaintiff's applica-
tions for building permits to erect hooded lights thirty-five feet high on 
a campus softball field and to convert an existing shed near the field 
into a snack bar.14 The Board of Appeals affirmed these denials, con-
cluding that in both instances the proposed change of use required a 
special permit to be granted by the board before a building permit 
could be issued.15 The plaintiff brought separate actions against the 
building inspector and the board to test the validity of these denials.16 
All five actions were consolidated for trial before a district judge 
sitting under statutory authority P At the conclusion of the trial, the 
judge ruled that the specific conditions attached to the grants of the 
special permits were valid, and that the board had authority to deny 
the building permit to erect the hooded lights.1s The judge concluded, 
however, that the board had no authority to impose the general condi-
tions upon the grant of the special permits, nor to deny the building 
permit for conversion of the shed into a snack bar.19 The plaintiff ap-
pealed from the judgment as to the softball field lights, and the building 
inspector and the board appealed the judgments concerning the change-
of-use rulings and the snack bar.20 
Initially, the Appeals Court noted that it was satisfied with the result 
reached by the trial judge in all but the decision concerning the 
lights.21 The court emphasized, however, that its disposition of the 
.issues was based upon the conclusion that the Lenox by-law exceeded 
tolerably permissible limits in its regulation of educational uses.22 It 
11 Id. at 1365, 391 N.E.2d at 281. 
12 Id. at 1365-66 & n.7, 391 N.E.2d at 281 & n.7. 
18 Id. at 1367, 391 N.E.2d at 281. 
14 Id., 391 N.E.2d at 281-82. 
15 Id. at 1367-68, 391 N.E.2d at 282. 
16 Id. at 1368, 391 N.E.2d at 282. 
17 Id. at 1368-69, 391 N.E.2d at 282. 
18 Id. at 1369, 391 N.E.2d at 282. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1369, 391 N.E.2d at 282-83. 
22Id. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/18
§15.2 ZONING AND LAND USE 409 
was not based upon the opinion of the district court judge that the 
board had exceeded its authority under the by-law. 
Before explaining how it reached its conclusion, however, the court 
addressed the plaintiff's view of how the new zoning law should be 
interpreted and applied to its use of land. The Appeals Court rejected 
the plaintiff's argument that it was entirely exempt from the effect of 
chapter 40A of the General Laws and from any local zoning regulations 
enacted pursuant to that act. 23 The plaintiff based its contention on 
language appearing in chapter 808, section 6, of Acts of 1975. This 
section provides that "the provisions of chapter forty A of the General 
Laws, as amended by section three of this act shall not be deemed to 
affect any church or other facilities used for religious purposes in exis-
tence or under construction prior to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred 
and seventy-eight." 24 The plaintiff claimed that this language was a 
legislative restatement of the Dover Amendment,25 which was part of 
the predecessor of the new section 3 of chapter 40A of the General 
Laws.26 The Dover Amendment invalidated any by-law or ordinance 
which prohibited or limited the use of land for religious or educational 
purposes. 27 Its purpose was to foreclose towns from exercising prefer-
ences with regard to what kinds of educational or religious denomina-
tions it would welcome.28 Since the plaintiff's principal function was 
to educate and train people for the ministry, the plaintiff argued that 
its use of property was a religious use for purposes of section 6.29 There-
fore, the plaintiff concluded, since all of its projects were started prior 
23 Id. at 1370-72, 391 N.E.2d at 283-84. 
24 Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 6. 
25 The Acts of 1950, c. 325, inserted the followin~ language into C.L. c. 40, § 25, 
a predecessor of the present C.L. c. 40A, § 3: 'No by-law or ordinance which 
prohibits or limits the use of land for any church or other religious purpose or 
which prohibits or limits the use of land for any religiOUS, sectarian or denomina-
tional educational purpose shall be, valid." This language became known as the 
Dover Amendment. See 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1370 n.10, 391 N.E.2d 
at 283 n.10. In Sisters of the Holy Cross of Massachusetts v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 
486, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964), the Court struck down the application ,of single-
family residence dimensional requirements to a sectarian educational institution as 
being in violaton of the Dover Amendment. Id. at 494, 198 N.E.2d at 631. The 
Court did not decide, however, whether dimensional requirements not affecting the 
use of the land would validly apply to a religious or educational institution. Id. 
at 495 n.9, 198 N.E.2d at 631 n.8. In Radcliffe College v. Cambridge, 350 Mass. 
613, 215 N.E.2d 892 (1966), the Court held that the Dover Amendment did not 
bar regulations which did not "impede" or "limit" the use of the land for educa-
tional purposes. Id. at 618, 215 N .E.2d at 896. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1372, 391 N.E.2d at 284. 
27 See text of Dover Amendment at note 25 supra. 
28 See 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1377, 391 N.E.2d at 286. 
29 Id. at 1372, 391 N.E.2d at 284. 
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to June 30, 1978, they were exempt from the application of chapter 40A 
and any local regulation enacted pursuant to the Zoning Act.30 
The Appeals Court rejected the broad interpretation suggested by 
the plaintiff and instead adopted a narrower position, which limited 
the uses exempt under section 6 to those uses that are intrinsically ac-
cessory to a church. 31 The court denied that section 6 of chapter 808 
of the Acts of 1975 was a restatement of the Dover Amendment. 32 The 
court viewed section 6 as a special non-conforming use provision of 
limited life.33 By examining and interpreting sections 3 and 6 together, 
in light of the case law, the Court concluded that; 
[Section] 6 was designed to permit exclusively church-like properties 
to continue projects under construction without encumbrance by 
local zoning by-laws until June 30, 1978, irrespective of a town's 
earlier acceptance of c. 808, while § 3 was intended to authorize a 
town such as Lenox, upon its acceptance of c. 808, to impose the 
type of regulations described in that section on sectarian educa-
tional uses or other religious uses which are not intrinsically acces-
sory to a church.34 
Thus, in the court's "iew, the two sections taken together serve to 
denominate religiOUS and sectarian educational uses as two separate 
categories. Only the former is exempt from local regulation prior to 
June 30, 1978, while the latter may be subject to the type of regulations 
described in section 3 of general laws chapter 40A.35 
In light of its interpretation of sections 3 and 6 of chapter 808 of the 
Act of 1975, the Appeals Court ruled that the plaintifFs proposed uses 
were not exempt from local regulation.36 The court concluded that the 
plaintifFs uses did fit within the broad definition of "education" as the 
term has been defined by case law,37 and were clearly educational in 
nature rather than religious.38 Therefore, they fell into the sectarian 
80Id. 
81 Id. at 1373, 391 N.E.2d at 284. 
82 Id. Instead, the court stated that it was C.L. c. 40A, § 3, appearing in the 
Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 3, that was intended by the legislature to synthesize the 
Dover Amendment and the case law construing it. Id. at 1372-73, 391 N.E.2d at 
284. See note 2 supra for the text of C.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
38 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1373, 391 N.E.2d at 284. 
84Id. 
85 See id. at 1373 & n.ll, 391 N.E.2d at 284 & n.ll. See text of C.L. c. 40A, 
§ 3, at note 2 supra. 
86 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1374, 391 N.E.2d at 285. 
37 See e.g., Radcliffe College v. Cambridge, 350 Mass. 613, 618, 215 N.E.2d 
892, 895 (1966), Mount Hermon Boys' Sch. v. Cill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N.E. 
354, 351 (1887). 
88 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1373-74, 391 N.E.2d at 284-85. 
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educational use category and were subject to the bulk, dimensional, 
and parking requirements permitted by section 3 of chapter 40A.39 
After determining that the plaintiff's proposed uses were subject to 
local regulation, the court proceeded to invalidate those sections of the 
Lenox by-law 40 that it considered went beyond the "reasonable regula-
tions" permitted by section 3.41 The court first addressed that section 
of the by-law requiring every non-municipal educational institution 
planning any change in its buildings or structures to file a site plan 
and informational statement with the board.42 The court found that 
such requirements were inappropriate for changes in educational uses 
because it exceeded the scope of all the reasonable bulk, dimensional, 
and parking requirements that could legitimately be imposed.43 Fur-
thermore, it appeared to the court that the board of appeals, by combin-
ing the site plan and informational statement requirements with another 
provision that made new or changed educational uses dependent upon 
the discretionary grant of a special permit, was attempting to exercise 
essentially planning board functions and pursue its own notions of land 
use planning.44 The court emphasized that the combination of these 
sections invested the board with a considerable amount of discretionary 
authority over an educational institution's use of its facilities.45 Such 
discretionary authority allowed for the possible subordination of the 
educational use to the board's own planning goals, even to the extent 
of impermissibly limiting or prohibiting the use. Therefore, the court 
concluded, the imposition of special permit requirements upon legiti-
mate educational uses, which had been expressly authorized to exist as 
of right in any zone, was clearly contrary to the intent of the legislature 
in enacting section 3.46 
In considering its final disposition of the case, the court treated the 
plaintifFs multiple actions as requests for declaratory relief.47 In 
granting such relief, the court determined that portions of the Lenox 
by-law were in conflict with the new Zoning Act, despite the presump-
tive validity of municipal zoning regulations.48 Rather than invalidate 
the entire section of the by-law, however, the court held that those 
39 Id. See text of C.L. c. 40A, § 3, at note 2 supra. 
40 Zoning by-law of Lenox, §§ 6 & 9.18 quoted in 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1364-65 n.5 & 6, 391 N.E.2d at 280-81, n.5 & 6. 
41 Id. at 1374-78, 391 N.E.2d at 285-87. 
42 Id. at 1375-77, 391 N.E.2d at 285-86. 
43 Id. at 1376, 391 N.E.2d at 286. 
44 Id. 
45 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1377, 391 N.E.2d at 286. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1378, 391 N.E.2d at 286. 
48 Id. See Crall v. Leominster, 362 Mass. 95, 102,284 N.E.2d 610, 615 (1972). 
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portions imposing bulk, dimensional, and parking requirements were 
severable and were valid.49 The remaining portions, those that imposed 
the requirements of a site plan, informational statement, and special 
permit before educational or religious institutions could expand, were 
held to be invalid. 50 The court thus ruled that the plaintiff was not 
required to apply for a special permit as a condition precedent to ob-
taining a building permit for the construction of the hooded lights; 51 
nor was it required to obtain either a special permit or a building 
permit to convert the shed into a snack bar.52 Finally, the court an-
nulled the general conditions annexed to the three change-of-use cases, 
with the notation that occupancy of the buildings could be conditioned 
upon compliance with the applicable parking requirements.53 
For a variety of reasons, municipalities have often attempted to ex-
clude religious and educational uses from residential areas. In many 
instances, the rationale employed to justify such exclusion may represent 
no more than a thinly-veiled attempt to discriminate against an un-
popular sect, the exclusion of which is deemed desirable according to 
community opinion. In addition, since the congregations of religiOUS 
sects are often comprised of people drawn from outside the community, 
the removal of property from the tax rolls for new religious or educa-
tional purposes increases the community's tax burden without benefiting 
its citizens. For this reason, a community may engage in a type of fiscal 
discrimination and seek to inhibit new and expanding religious or 
educational uses. The Dover Amendment,54 enacted to prevent these 
types of discrimination, achieved its desired aim at the expense of the 
complete removal of the regulation of religious and educational uses 
from community control. The special zoning status afforded such uses 
may, however, create problems that are best left to local control. For 
example, such uses typically generate high-traffic conditions, at least 
during certain times of the week, and a community may well be con-
cerned about the use's impact upon the traffic patterns of a residential 
neighborhood. The site plan and informational statement requirements 
of the Lenox by-law reflect this concern. 
The position adopted by the Appeals Court in The Bible Speaks strikes 
a balance between the interests of the community and the interests of 
religious and educational organizations. By invalidating the site plan 
and informational statement requirements, the Appeals Court has re-
49 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1378, 391 N.E.2d at t}J37. 
50ld. 
1I11d. 
52 ld. at 1379, 391 N.E.2d at t}J37. 
531d. 
54 See text and notes at notes 25-28 supra. 
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jected the proposition, accepted in other jurisdictions,.I)~ that severe traf-
fic congestion problems resulting from a religious or educational use in 
a residential area is sufficient to justify the exclusion of the use from 
the neighborhood. The decision does not, however, completely ignore 
the community's concern for such problems. The decision, while giving 
effect to the clear intent of the legislature to allow some local control 
over the traffic patterns of residential areas, permits this control to be 
exercised only in the form of parking requirements. It also makes clear 
that it is the responsibility of the municipality to determine the amount 
of parking required to offset traffic congestion. The Bible Speaks indi-
cates that the court would be reluctant to accept any form of local 
regulation beyond that expressly described in section 3.56 Nevertheless, 
the flexible position adopted by the Appeals Court protects the commu-
nity interest without total exclusion of religiOUS and educational uses 
from residential neighborhoods. 
Finally, the court's extension of the definition of the term "education" 
to include the use of land for lighted softball fields and snack bars is 
also significant. The court gives every indication that such uses, at 
least when in conjunction with a bona fide educational program, are 
uses for educational purposes, and therefore, are not subiect to local 
prohibitions or limitations. Therefore, so long as the applicable height 
restrictions are met, an educational institution may construct lighted 
softball fields and snack bars as of right. 
§15.3. Zoning-DefInition of "Lot." During the 1979 Survey year, 
the Appeals Court was again faced with what has proven to be a dif-
ficult, or at least frequently litigated, zoning problem, the zoning defini-
tion of '10t." The issue before the court in Heald v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of Greenfield 1 was whether, for purposes of the application of 
the Greenfield zoning by-law, the word "lot" should mean a lot as de-
scribed in a deed, record, plan, or other source of title, or should mean 
contiguous lots held in common ownership.2 
{Iii Most notably, California, Connecticut, Florida and Oregon. For a Jeading 
case from each respeotive jurisdiction, see Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 
656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949); West Hartford 
Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of West Hartford, 143 Conn. 263, 121 
A.2d 640 (1956); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City 
of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses 
v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), appeal dismissed and eert. denied 
359 U.S. 436 (1959). For a discussion of the above cases, and of the exclusion 
of religious and educational uses from residential areas because of their high-traffic 
generating capacity, see 3 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 
§ 77.12, at 589 (1975) . 
.1)6 C.L. c. 4OA, § 3. See text of statute at note 2 supra. 
§15.3. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 520, 387 N.E.2d 170. 
2 ld. at 520, 387 N.E.2d at 171. 
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In this case, the plaintiff Heald owned four adjoining parcels of land 
that had been recorded on a grid mode plan in December 1890.3 The 
arrangement of the parcels on the plan was such that only one fronted 
on what is presently Federal Street in Greenfield.' By 1950, however, 
the boundaries of the parcels had been altered so that now four of the 
new total of five parcels fronted Federal Street.5 The plaintiff appar-
ently had acquired title to three of his four parcels from previous own-
ers, who held them in common ownership at the time of Greenfield's 
adoption of a zoning by-law in 1957, although the deed into the common 
owners described the land by reference to three separate prior deed 
descriptions.6 Of the plaintiff's four parcels, three fronted on Federal 
Street and the fourth (back lot) ran directly behind the others.7 The 
1957 by-law and zoning map established a commercial district along 
Federal Street "for depth of lot but not greater than 400 feet." 8 When 
the plaintiff applied for a building permit to build a fast food restaurant 
on three of his lots, including the back lot, the permit was denied by 
both the building inspector and the board of appeals.9 
On appeal to the superior court, the trial judge compared the original 
1957 by-law with Greenfield's 1965 zoning law amendment, which in-
cluded a revised definition of "lot." 10 In his memorandum of decision, 
the judge stated that under the earlier 1957 definition of "lot," 11 the 
back lot could not be used for commercial purposes.12 The revised defi-
nition of "lot," however, permitted commonly owned contiguous parcels 
to be considered one lot for zoning purposes and therefore did not 
prohibit commercial use of the back lot.13 Consequently, the judge 
8 Id. 
4 See diagram, id. at 522, 387 N.E.2d at 172. 
II Id. 
6 Id. at 521, 387 N.E.2d at 172. 
7 See diagram, id. at 522, 387 N.E.2d at 172. 
8 Id. at 521, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
9 Id. at 521, 387 N .E.2d at 171. 
10 Id. at 523, 387 N.E.2d at 173. The 1957 by-law, as first enacted, defined 
"lot" as "a piece or parcel of land occupied or to be occupied by one main building 
and its accessory buildings." Id. at 521, 387 N.E.2d at 172-73. The 1965 revised 
definition of "lot" read: 
A continuous parcel of land meeting the lot requirement of the by-law for the 
district in which the land is situated, and if occupied by a building or build-
ings, meeting the minimum yard requirements of that district and having the 
required frontage on a street or on such other means of access as may be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of the law to be adequate as a 
condition of the issuance of a building permit. 
Id. at 523, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
11 See note 10 supra. 
12 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 523, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
13 Id. All parties agreed that the Court must apply the 1005 by-law. It was 
also agreed that the only significance of the 1957 by-law was that it might serve 
as a guide to interpreting the applicable provisions of the 1965 by-hiw. Id. 
12
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annulled the decision of the board, in effect requiring the issuance of 
a building permit.14 The intervenors in the case appealedYi 
The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, but 
disagreed with that court's interpretation of the 1957 definition of 
''lot.'' 16 The intervenors, on appeal, had argued that the 1965 definition 
worked no material change in the 1957 definition,17 According to their 
argument, if the 1957 definition determined what was a lot by reference 
to the source of title or assessor's plan, as the trial judge apparently 
implied, and the 1965 amendment worked no material change, then the 
plaintiff owned four separate zoning "lots" and should be denied the 
use of the back lot for commercial purposes. The Appeals Court re-
jected this argument, concluding that under both the 1957 and the 1965 
definitions a common owner could treat parcels with separate sources 
of title as one "lot" for zoning purposes.18 The court cited with approval 
a consistent line of Supreme Judicial Court decisions holding that, in 
the absence of specific zoning code provisions defining "lot" in terms 
of sources of title or assessor's plans, adjOining parcels may be consid-
ered one lot for zoning purposes.10 Furthermore, the Appeals Court 
noted a recent statement of its own: "[T]he usual construction of the 
word 'lot' in a zoning context ignores the manner in which components 
of a total given area have been assembled and concentrates instead on 
the question whether the sum of the components meet [sic] the require-
ments of the by-law." 20 Thus, even if the 1965 amendment worked no 
material change in the definition of "lot," the by-law would still permit 
the plaintiff to treat his oontiguous parcels of land as one ''lot'' for 
zoning purposes. 
In its opinion, the court emphaSized that a zoning code must remain 
responsive to changing patterns of land use. These changes frequently 
require land assembly and realignment of historic lot lines.21 A con-
trary interpretation would restrict landowners to descriptions of record, 
14 Id. at 521, 387 N.E.2d at 171. 
111 Id. 
16 Id. at 520, 523-24, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
17 Id. at 523, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
18 Id. at 523-24, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
19 Id. at 524, 387 N.E.2d at 173. See Gaudet v. Building Inspector of Dracut, 
358 Mass. 807, 808, 265 N.E.2d 375, 376 (1970) (rescript opinion); Vassalotti v. 
Board of Appeals of Sudbury, 348 Mass. 658, 661, 204 N .E.2d 924, 926-27 (1965); 
Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 630, 116 N.E.2d 277, 
278 (1953). 
20 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 524, 387 N.E.2d at 173 (quoting Becket v. 
Building Inspector of Marblehead, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 185, 194, 373 
N.E.2d 1195, 1199). For a discussion of Becket, see Huber, Zoning and Land 
Use, 1978 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAw § 11.2, at 244-48. 
21 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 525, 387 N.E.2d at 173. 
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thereby preventing many contemporary uses of land that generally re-
quire land assembly. 22 Furthermore, the court noted that some land 
assembly must have been contemplated by the Greenfield by-law, which 
permits commercial development to a depth of four hundred feet.23 
The problem exemplified by the Heald case occurs frequently in zon-
ing law. Heald demonstrates with particular clarity the significant role 
that the definition of a lot may play in determining which uses of prop-
erty are allowable under an ordinance or by-law. The decision spe-
cifically addresses the common cause, of such disputes, namely, the 
anachronistic conception of a lot as a tract of land with only one build-
ing. To some extent, the traditional definition of a lot is perpetuated 
by the zoning plan itself. A zoning ordinance or by-law normally 
speaks in terms of lots in restricting the uses of land, as was the case 
in Heald. Since the predominant use restriction of any zoning plan is 
for single-family residential use, the plan and accompanying map may 
reserve large tracts of vacant land for future residential development. 
These tracts may be divided into lots as a means of denSity control. 
Lot size and minimum yard requirements may be imposed to ensure 
privacy and to reduce the danger to public health. Such requirements 
also allow a community to regulate the placement of homes, thereby 
facilitating the development of the amenities of the area. The single-
family landowner, who must comply with such regulations and who is 
assessed for the value of his lot for tax purposes, thereafter often mis-
conceives the boundaries of his residential lot as constituting the boun-
daries of a zoning lot. 
Modem multi-family, as well as commercial and industrial, uses, how-
ever, require the assembly of many of these traditional single-family 
residential lots to develop a usable area. These assembled parcels be-
come the new "lot" for purposes of zoning regulation. The retention 
by title and assessment records of the old descriptions of "lots" is, as 
the court noted, irrelevant to the use of the word '1ot" for zoning pur-
poses. Even single-family residences are in most cases built on large 
tracts, which may well have been assembled. Hence, the use of the 
term "lot" as a type of density control and as a device to regulate the 
placement of homes can often be anachronistic. For this reason, cluster 
zoning and other flexible devices have been developed, even for single-
family residential building, to facilitate the best possible use of land, 
and to facilitate the development of amenities for those homes built as 
a single unit. 
22 See id. 
28 Id. at 525, 387 N.E.2<l at 174. 
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The importance of the Heald decision lies in its rejection of the tradi-
tional definition of a lot. Although each of the plaintiffs parcels was 
assessed separately at values suggesting residential use, the court sum-
marily rejected the argument that their status for zoning purposes should 
be determined by their assessment history.24 It is clear that a zoning 
lot is not necessarily the same as a tax lot, although the two are often 
confused. Moreover, the court emphasized that a municipality must 
use express language in order to restrict the use of property in terms 
of a lot as identified by its source of title. In so doing, it indicated 
that the rules of judicial construction favor the more expansive use of 
the land.211 Heald points out that zoning ordinances and by-laws often 
may not reHect this approach to the assembly of land into new and 
generally larger and different tracts. 
§15.4. Eminent Domain-Special and Peculiar Injury. One recurrent 
and difficult problem arising in eminent domain cases involves compen-
sation for losses suffered when no part of the landowner's property is 
actually taken. Section 12 of chapter 79 of the General Laws states the 
rule as follows: "In determining the damages to a parcel . . . injured 
when no part of it has been taken, regard shall be had only to such 
injury as is special and peculiar to such parcel . . .. " 1 Following the 
doctrine established in Hyde v. City of Fall River,2 the Massachusetts 
courts have construed very narrowly the words "special and peculiar 
injury." The Hyde decision interpreted the statutory language to re-
quire that the injury suffered not be the same in kind as that suffered 
by the public generally.3 The most common situation in which dam-
ages are sought when no actual taking has occurred involves impairment 
of a landowner's access to his property because of some governmental 
action.4 Generally, the landowner's remedy is the initiation of an action 
to recover damages for a reduction in the usefulness of his parcel. Often 
the main issue in such cases arising under section 12 is whether the 
24 ld. at 527, 387 N.E.2d at 174. 
211 See id. at 526, 387 N.E.2d at 174. 
§15.4. 1 G.L. c. 79, § 12. 
2 189 Mass. 439, 75 N.E. 953 (1905). 
3 ld. at 440, 75 N.E. at 953. This early leading case construed § 12 so nar-
rowly that recovery in access cases was possible in only a very few situations. For 
a discussion of the harshness of the rule, see Mr. Justice Cutter's dissent in Tas-
sinari v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 347 Mass. 222, 226-30, 197 N.E.2d 584, 
586-89 (1964) noted in D'Agostine & Huber, Land Use Planning, 1964 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW § 14.23, at 177-78. 
4 See, e.g., LaCroix v. Commonwealth, 348 Mass. 652, 205 N.E.2d 228 (1965) 
(construction of a limited access highway) noted in D'Agostine & Huber, Land Use 
Planning, 1965 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.26, at 205-08; Betty Corp. v. Common-
wealth, 354 Mass. 312, 237 N.E.2d 26 (1968) (construction of a barrier by the 
Department of Public Works) noted in Huber & Mills, Land Use Planning Law, 
1968 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAw § 12.11, at 356-58. 
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impairment of access suffered by the landowner is such as to constitute 
a "special and peculiar injury." When such an injury is found, the 
landowner is entitled to recover damages as measured by the reduction 
in value of the property. 
During the 1979 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court re-examined 
the nature of a "special and peculiar injury" in the impairment of 
access situation. In Malone v. Commonwealth,5 the landowner sought 
damages for the reduction in value of his property which resulted from 
the relocation of a part of a state highway onto which the property 
abutted.6 Both prior to and after the relocation, the plaintiffs operated 
a gift shop on the situs.7 Before the relocation, the parcel fronted a 
portion of Route 10 that formed a curve or crescent.s The relocation 
project straightened the highway by means of a new section connecting 
the terminal points of the curve, and the curved portion was rebuilt as 
a connector road in the shape of a half-circle.9 As a result of the 
highway's relocation, the plaintiffs' property fronted the connector road 
rather than the highway itself. Thus, a motorist's view of the gift shop 
as it was approached along the highway was substantially impaired.10 
At the trial, a real estate developer testified that the highest and best 
use of the property after the relocation was for storage, rather than for 
a retail store such as was operated by the plaintiffs. l1 Consequently, at 
the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded $6,200 in damages to the 
plaintiffs for the permanent diminution in the market value of the prop-
erty.12 The Commonwealth appealed, and the case was transferred to 
the Supreme Judicial Court upon its own motion.13 ' 
In reversing the trial court's award, the Supreme Judicial Court ini-
tially distinguished between "impairment of access which if substantial 
may figure as special and peculiar injury deserving compensation," 14 
and mere "diversion of traffic which lies outside the compensable cate-
gory even if it results in a decline in the property's market value." 111 
1\ 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1250, 389 N.E.2d 975. 
6 ld. at 1250, 389 N.E.2d at 976. 
7 ld. at 1251, 1253, 389 N.E.2d at 976, m. 
S ld. at 1251-52, 389 N.E.2d at 977. 
9 ld. at 1252, 389 N.E.2d at 977. 
10 See id. From one direction, the view of the shop was partially obstructed 
by an embankment, while from the other, the line of sight to the shop was obscured 
by trees which the plaintiffs were unable to obtain pennission to remove. ld. & n.5. 
11 ld. at 1253, 389 N.E.2d at 977. 
12 ld. at 1250-51, 389 N.E.2d at 976. 
18 ld. at 1251, 389 N.E.2d at 976. 
14 ld. at 1254, 389 N.E.2d at 978. 
15 ld. This distinction has been well-settled under Massachusetts law since 
Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 31 N.E. 702 (1892), in which Holmes, J., 
wrote "[Ilt is not enough to s~ow that a shop has suffered by the diversion of 
16
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In the Court's view, the proper test of "special and peculiar" injury in 
the access situation is the assessment of a variety of factors, including 
the existence, availability, and feasibility of access routes in connection 
with the uses of the property.16 In applying this test to the facts of the 
case, the Court determined that there had been no actionable impair-
ment of access, since the property remained fully accessible to both 
the plaintiffs and their patrons.17 The Court considered that the plain-
tiffs' relation to the road system had not been unreasonably impaired.1s 
Rather, the plaintiffs' loss resulted from a diversion of traffic, which did 
not rise to the level of a compensable injury under the traditional 
Massachusetts approach.19 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that changes in traf-
fic patterns not so drastic as to amount to a deprivation of "access," but 
nevertheless causing material injury to property values, were deserving 
of compensation.20 The Court admitted that such an argument had 
some persuasive force. It also recognized a more general argument for 
exceeding conventional legal bounds in order to compensate a range 
of intangible private losses incident to carrying out public projects.21 
The Court cited economic efficiency and a general consistency with the 
fundamental principles of the law of eminent domain as justification 
for such an argument. 22 Nevertheless, the Court declined to extend 
compensation beyond its traditional limits, primarily on the theory that 
the attributes of private property are such as to preclude compensation 
in each instance where a particular injury follows upon governmental 
action.23 Under this theory, compensation flows from the deprivation 
of some property right. In the Court's view, the advantages enjoyed 
by a landowner as a result of pre-existing traffic patterns could not be 
considered such aright. 24 The Court also indicated that its decision 
was based in part upon the fear that the expense of litigating claims 
and of compensating for such "comparatively impalpable" injuries might 
travel, or that the owner finds travel less convenient at a distance from his place, 
if the access to the system of public streets remains substantially unimpaired.' ld. 
at 19, 31 N.E. at 703. 
16 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1257, 389 N.E.2d at 979. 
17 ld. at 1257-58, 389 N.E.2d at 979. 
18 See id. at 1257, 389 N.E.2d at 979. 
19 ld. at 1258; 389 N.E.2d at 979. 
20 ld. at 1258-59, 389 N.E.2d at 979-80. 
21 ld. 
22 Id. at 1259, 389 N.E.2d at 980. For discussion of these arguments, see, Van 
Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Modi-
fications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, (1969); cf. Michelman, Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
23 See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1260, 389 N.E.2d at 980. 
24 ld. 
17
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unduly discourage public projects in the first instance.2li Therefore, 
while acknowledging that the current limitation of liability may be 
somewhat arbitrary, the Court nonetheless acquiesced in the limitations 
as it has been developed over the years and vacated the judgment 
award.26 
The Malone decision indicates that the Supreme Judicial Court has 
shifted away from the extremely narrow interpretation of section 12 
embodied in the Hyde doctrine. The standard adopted by the Court 
for determining whether there has been a special· and peculiar injury 
involves consideration of the degree of the loss of access suHered and 
not whether the landowner's loss was unique in the sense that it was 
not shared in some small part by the general public. This position is 
the reverse of that taken in Hyde. Furthermore, the Court's discussion 
of the possibility of extending compensation beyond its conventional 
legal limits suggests a fundamental sympathy for the plight of the 
landowner. Thus, while the Court declined to uphold compensation 
upon the facts of Malone,27 the decision indicates that the Court may 
be more receptive to findings of special and peculiar damages than in 
the past. If so, the harshness of the Hyde doctrine may perhaps finally 
be eliminated in a broad category of situations. 
§15.5. The Protection of Coastal Wetlands-Local Regulations-Un-
constitutional Taking. In Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of 
Dennis, l the Supreme Judicial Court was required to examine the valid-
ity of the wetlands protection by-law of the town of Dennis, as well 
as the validity of action taken by the town conservation commission 
under the by-law. Substantial portions of the by-law involved were 
directly modeled upon the commonwealth's Wetlands Protection Act.2 
211 ld. at 1260, 389 N.E.2d at 980-81. 
26 ld. at 1261, 389 N.E.2d at 981. 
27 The Court expressly stated that '10ss of access need not be complete to justify 
an award." ld. at 1256, 389 N.E.2d at 979. The facts of the case in Malone, how-
ever, did not justify a finding of any loss of access, but only the loss of visibility 
of the shop from the relocated highway. 
§15.5. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 393 N.E.2d 858. 
2 The Wetlands Protection Act, C.L. c. 131, § 40, provides in relevant part: 
No person shall remove, fill, dredge or alter any bank, fresh water wetland, 
coastal wetland, beach, dune, Hat, marsh, meadow or swamp bordering on the 
ocean or any estuary, creek, river, stream, pond, or lake . . . withOut filing 
written notice of his intention to so remove, fill, dredge or alter . . . to the 
conservation commission . . . of a city in which the proposed activity is to be 
located .. .. . 
The conservation commission ... receiving notice under this section shall 
hold a public hearing on the proposed activity . . . . 
If after said hearing the conservation commission . . . determiners] that the 
area on which the proposed work is to be done is significant to public or l!,,:e 
water supply, to groQIld water supply, to Hood control, to storm ge 
18
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The by-law, however, also included a section that empowered the town's 
conservation commission to deny permission for any removal, dredging, 
filling, or altering of any land within the town if the commission decides 
that such denial is necessary to preserve the environmental quality of 
that land or contiguous lands.3 The Lovequist decision addresses the 
question of whether a local conservation committee's exercise of such 
power is in derogation of state law. 
The plaintiffs in Lovequist owned a tract of land in Dennis. They 
wished to subdivide a portion of the property into house lots for single-
family residences.4 To that end, the plaintiffs filed a written notice of 
intent to construct a road over adjoining marshlands to facilitate service 
to the proposed subdivision.5 By filing the notice of intent, the plain-
tiffs triggered proceedings under both the Wetlands Protection Act 6 
and the Dennis by-law.7 At the conclusion of the required public 
hearing, the Dennis Conservation Commission denied the plaintiffs' ap-
plication on the grounds that the construction of the road would have 
a detrimental impact upon the environment of both subject and con-
tiguous lands.8 The plaintiffs appealed the denial to the superior court. 
The superior court remanded the case to the commission for further 
hearings and reconsideration, while retaining jurisdiction.9 At the con-
clusion of the additional hearings, the commission again denied the 
plaintiffs' application. It concluded that the proposed road construc-
tion would create serious groundwater and water pollution problems.10 
When the matter was retumed to superior court, the court dismissed 
the original complaint and entered judgment affirming the commission's 
denial of the construction permitY The case was thereafter transferred 
to the Supreme Judicial Court upon its own motion.12 
prevention, to prevention of pollution, to protection of land containing shell-
fish, or to the protection of fisheries, such conservation commission . . . shall 
... impose such conditions as will contribute to the protection of the, interests 
described herein, and all work shall be done in accordance therewith. 
Id. Article 15, section 1, of the by-laws of the town of Dennis is directly modeled 
upon these provisions of the Wetlands Protection Act. See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 2212 n.3, 393 N.E.2d at 860 n.3. 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2212 n.3, 393 N.E.2d at 860 n.3. 
4 Id. at 2210-11, 393 N.E.2d at 860. 
5 Id. at 2211, 393 N .E.2d at 860. 
6 C.L. c. 1131, § 40. See note 2 supra for text of statute. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2211, 393 N.E.2d at 860. See note 2 supra for text 
of applicable laws. 
8 Id. at 2212-13, 393 N.E.2d at 861. 
9 Id. at 2213, 393 N.E.2d at 861. 
10Id. 
11 Id. 
12Id. 
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In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
initially rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the Dennis wetlands 
protection by-law was void under the Home Rule Amendment13 as 
inconsistent with the Zoning Act.14 The plaintiffs maintained that since 
the by-law regulated land use, it was by nature a zoning enactment.11i 
Relying upon Rayeo Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham,16 
where the Supreme Judicial Court had found that a town by-law limit-
ing the total number of trailer park licenses in the town was a zoning 
regulation,17 the plaintiffs argued that the enactment of ordinances or 
by-laws regulating land use must likewise comply with the manner and 
method mandated by the Zoning Act.18 Citing other Supreme Judicial 
Court decisions approving a town's wetlands by-law as a valid exercise 
of its zoning power,19 the plaintiffs urged the generalized view that all 
local wetlands enactments are zoning measures.20 Therefore, their argu-
ment concluded, the town's failure to comply with the procedural pro-
tections of the Zoning Act rendered the local wetlands by-law invalid 
under the Home Rule Amendment, since the Zoning Act prescribes the 
ways in which a municipality may exercise its zoning power.21 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Court ruled that not all 
ordinances or by-laws that regulate land use are to be considered zoning 
regulations.22 The Court distinguished Rayeo, by emphasizing the his-
torical context of the by-law at issue in that case. It observed that the 
by-law considered in Rayeo had purported to cover the subject of trailer 
parks in a comprehensive fashion. 23 In Lovequist, however, there was 
no evidence of any comprehensive zoning by-law governing wetland 
activities in Dennis.24 Moreover, the Court stated that Rayeo "nowhere 
13 MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, § 6. This section provides, in part: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local 
ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court 
has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution 
or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to 
the general court . . . . 
14 G.L. c. 40A. See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2214-15, 393 N.E.2d at 861-62. 
15 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2215, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
16 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). 
17 Id. at 393, 331 N.E.2d at 914. 
18 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2215, 2217, 393 N.E.2d at 862, 863. 
19 See, e.g., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 340 
N.E.2d 487 (1976) (MacGibbon III); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 
221,284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Golden V. Select-
men of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970). 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2215, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
21 Id. See Canton V. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87 (1972). 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2215-16, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
23 Id. at 2218, 393 N.E.2d at 863 (quoting Rayco Inv. Corp. V. Selectmen of 
Raynham, 368 Mass. 385, 393, 331 N.E.2d 910, 914 (1975». 
24 rd. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/18
§15.5 ZONING AND LAND USE 423 
suggests that municipal regulations that simply overlap with what may 
be the province of the local zoning authority are to be treated as zoning 
enactments which must be promulgated in accordance with the require-
ments of C.L. c. 40A." 25 In determining that the Dennis wetlands by-
law should not be considered a zoning regulation, the Court also ex-
amined the purpose of the by-law and its impact upon land use. This 
examination led the Court to conclude that the by-law did not embody 
the typical concerns usually reflected in the zoning process. Rather, it 
manifested one dominant purpose, the protection of wetland values.26 
The Court found the Dennis wetlands by-law comparable to an earth 
removal enactment, a type of general by-law expressly authorized by 
statute. 27 The Court observed that non-zoning earth removal enact-
ments need not comply with the prescriptions of the Zoning Act, since 
those prescriptions are applicable only if a town chooses to adopt a 
zoning by-Iaw.28 Moreover, the Court noted that such enactments have 
been found valid even when a town has adopted a zoning by-Iaw.29 
Thus, the Court concluded that the Dennis wetlands by-law was not 
a zoning regulation. Therefore, it was not invalid for failure to com-
ply with the procedural protections of the Zoning Act. 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' assertions that the Dennis by-
law conflicted with the Wetlands Protection Act 30 and was therefore 
invalid under the Home Rule Amendment.31 The plaintiffs first main-
tained that since the Wetlands Protection Act did not give any express 
or implied powers to a municipality to enact wetlands by-laws outside 
of a zoning framework, the enactment of a general rather than a zoning 
by-law for wetlands protection purposes contravened the statute.82 In 
rejecting this contention, the Court concluded that the wetlands statute 
in no way intimated such a result. ss Furthermore, the Court noted that 
the Home Rule Amendment itself suggested the contrary conclusion.84 
The Court Similarly rejected the plaintiffs' second contention that the 
Dennis by-law conflicted with the Wetlands Protection Act because the 
by-law allowed the conservation commission to prohibit outright any 
2G Id. 
26 Id. at 2217, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
27 Id. at 2216, 393 N.E.2d at 862. See G.L. c. 40, § 21(7), which empowers 
municipalities to enact prohibitions against earth removal. 
28 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2216, 393 N.E.2d at 862. 
29 Id. (Citing Beard v. Salisbury, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1703, 1708 n.7, 392 
N.E.2d 832, 835 n.7; Byrne v. Middleborough, 364 Mass. 331, 334, 304 N.E.2d 
194, 196 (1973». 
30 G.L. c. 131, § 40. See note 2 supra for text of statute. 
81 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2218, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
82Id. 
S3Id. 
S4 Id. at 2219, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
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disturbance of covered lands.35 The Court found that the language of 
the Wetlands Protection Act permitting conservation commissions to 
"impose such conditions as will contribute to the protection of the 
interests" described therein did not forbid the granting of such author-
ity to conservation commissions.36 The Court reaffirmed the position it 
had taken in Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth,37 where it had stated 
that the Wetlands Protection Act set forth minimum standards only, 
"leaving local communities free to adopt more stringent controls." 38 
RefUSing to distinguish Golden on the basis that it involved a considera-
tion of a zoning by-law rather than the general by-law involved in the 
instant case, the Court stated, "[WJe can conceive of no reason why the 
Wetlands Protection Act would be any more frustrated by a by-law 
enacted pursuant to town powers outside the zoning authority." 39 
Finally, the Court noted that for nearly five years the regulations promul-
gated under the wetlands protection statute had accorded conservation 
commissions the prerogative to prohibit construction which might injure 
wetland areas.40 Consequently, the Court concluded that the by-law's 
allowance of a total ban on the disturbance of covered areas did not 
represent a conflict between state and local law. 
Having concluded that the by-law did not conflict with the Wetlands 
Protection Act, the Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' final claim that 
the conservation commission's denial of the construction permit 
amounted to an . unconstitutional taking of property without compensa-
tion.41 The plaintiffs argued that the loss of anticipated profits resulting 
from development of the property warranted due process protection.42 
The Court refused to accept the plaintiffs position. Instead it charac-
terized an unlawful taking as a governmental action "which strip[sJ 
private property 'of all practical value to [the owners] or to anyone 
acquiring it, leaving them only with the burden of paying taxes on it: "48 
35 ld. 
36 ld. (quoting C.L. c. 131, § 40). 
37 358 Mass. 519, 526, 265 N.E.2d 573,577 (1970). For a discussion of Golden, 
see Huber, Land Use Law, 1971 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 17.3, at 489-90. 
38 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2219, 393 N.E.2d at 863 (quoting Golden, 358 Mass. 
at 526, 265 N.E.2d at 577). 
39 ld. 
40 ld. For the applicable regulations. see regulations under the Wetlands Protec-
tion Act, 310 C.M.R. § 10. . 
41 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2225, 393 N.E.2d at 866. The plaintiffs also rai~ed 
arguments concerning the bias of members of the Dennis Conservation Commission 
and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the commission's decisions. ld. at 
2220-25, 393 N .E.2d at 864-65. 
42 ld. at 2225, 393 N.E.2d at 866. 
43 ld. at 2226, 393 N.E.2d at 866 (quoting MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of 
Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 641, 255 N.E.2d 347, 352 (1970) (MacGibbon 11), 
quoted in MacCibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 517, 340 
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Since the Court determined that practical uses of the property remained 
available to the plaintiffs, it ruled that no unconstitutional taking re-
sulted from the commission's actions.44 
The Lovequist decision indicates the extent to which the Supreme 
Judicial Court is willing to accept the involvement of local communities 
in conservation efforts. The Court had previously concluded that the 
protection of coastal wetlands for environmental reasons was a proper 
public purpose for the exercise of the municipality's zoning power.4fi 
In Lovequist, the Court found the conservation of natural resources to 
be a permissible exercise of the municipality's general powers as well. 
Thus, a municipality that chooses not to adopt a zoning by-law is not 
deprived of an opportunity to participate in conservation efforts. Fur-
thermore, as long as a property owner is not deprived of all practical 
uses of his property, following Loveqttist, it should make no difference 
that the municipality's exercise of its general powers exceeds state law 
in conserving natural resources. 
§15.6. Zoning Appeals Procedure-Non-Jurisdictional Defects. In 
Twomey v. Board of Appeals of Medford,1 the Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether a plaintiff's failure to comply strictly with the notice 
and procedure provisions of section 17 of the new Zoning Act 2 deprived 
the court of jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a zoning board decision. 
The plaintiffs were an unincorporated association of abutters and neigh-
bors of a tract of land located in Medford and owned by the defendant 
Trustees of Tufts College. 3 Tufts had been granted variances and a 
special permit by the defendant Board of Appeals of Medford.4 As 
prescribed by section 17,5 the plaintiffs filed an appeal from the decision 
N.E.2d 487, 490 (976) (MacGibbon III)). For an extensive discussion of the 
taking issue, see Student Comment, Zoning arid Land Use, 1976 ANN. SURV. MAss. 
LAW § 15.16, at 511-42. 
44 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2226-27, 393 N.E.2d at 866. 
45 See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512, 517, 340 
N.E.2d 487, 490 (1976) (MacGibbon Ill). 
§15.6. 1 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1236, 390 N.E.2d 272. 
2 C.L. c. 40A, § 17, as in effeot prior to Acts of 1978, c. 478, § 32. The 
relevant portions of section 17, which remained unaffected by the 1978 amendment, 
are as follows: 
To avoid delay in the proceedings, instead of the usual service of process, the 
plaintiff shall within fourteen days after the filing of the complaint, send 
written notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, by delivery or certified 
mail to all defendants, including the members of the board of appeals or 
special permit granting authority and shall within twenty-one days after the 
entry of the complaint file with the clerk of the court an affidavit that such 
notice has been give,n. If no such affidavit is filed within such time the com-
plaint shall be dismissed 
3 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1236 n.1, 390 N.E.2d at 272 n.1. 
4 ld. at 1237, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
5 C.L. c. 40A, § 17. See note 2 supra. 
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of the board within the twenty-day period following the filing of the 
board's decision.6 On the same day as they filed their appeal, the 
plaintiffs served the city clerk in hand with a copy of the complaint. 
They also served copies of the complaint by certified mail to the chair-
man of the Board of Appeals and the president of Tufts College.7 A 
certificate of service meeting these facts had been attached to the com-
plaint.s Three weeks later, but after the expiration of the fourteen-day 
notification period of section 17,n the plaintiffs again served the board 
chairman and the president of Tufts, this time by deputy sheriff.10 
Within the following week, the plaintiffs also sent copies of their com-
plaint by certified mail to the remaining three members of the Board 
of Appeals. l1 No affidavit of service to these remaining board members 
was filed with the clerk of the court.12 
Tufts moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the superior 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had neither 
served the board within the statutory fourteen-day period, nor filed an 
affidavit of service, both as required by section 17.13 The board had 
previously filed an answer, and at no time did it raise any of the proce-
dural defects asserted by Tufts.14 Tufts' motion to dismiss was allowed 
by the superior court and a judgment was entered for Tufts.11S Sub-
sequently, the judgment was amended to include all defendants.16 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and reinstated the com-
plaint,17 Initially, the court noted that it would be guided by the 
recent decision of Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Carver,18 where the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that not all errors in the procedure of such 
actions required dismissal as a matter of law.19 Citing Pierce, the 
6 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1237, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
7 Id. 
8Id. 
o C.L. c. 40A, § 17. See note 2 supra. 
10 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1237, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 1237-38, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
13 Id. at 1238, 390 N.E.2d at 273. See C.L. c. 40A, § 17, reprinted at note 2 
supra. The defendants also asserted two other grounds for dismissal not relevant 
to this discussion. See 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1238, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
14 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1238, 390 N.E.2d at 273. 
111 Id. 
16Id. 
17 Id. at 1244, 390 N.E.2d at 276. 
18 369 Mass. 804, 343 N .E.2d 412 (1976), noted in Huber, Zoning and Land 
Use, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.14, at 498-501. 
19 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1239-40, 390 N.E.2d at 274. See 369 Mass. 
at 807-08, 343 N.E.2d at 414. Pierce was decided under the former Zoning En-
abling Act, C.L. c. 40A, § 21, as in effect prior to the present Zoning Act, C.L. c. 
40A, § 17. Among the numerous differences between the two sections is the 
presence in the latter of an additional provision that this author, in 1976 ANN. 
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court stated that the plaintiffs, by serving the city clerk in hand with 
a copy of the complaint, had furnished "constructive notice" to all in-
terested parties.20 The court also noted that all of the board members 
had received actual notice, although it was not timely.21 Repeating the 
view adopted in Pierce, the court stated that in such situations the deter-
minative issue is whether the defendants were prejudiced by the ir-
regular manner of service.22 Since neither defendant had either alleged 
or demonstrated prejudice resulting from the irregular service, the court 
consequently concluded that neither defect was fatal to the action.23 
The Twomey decision is consistent with the recent trend in appellate 
court decisions concerning the effects of procedural defects upon an 
appeal of a zoning decision. 24 Notwithstanding the explicit language 
of the statute, the Appeals Court in Twomey ruled that neither the 
failure to serve all defendants in a timely fashion, nor the failure to file 
an affidavit of service is per se a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal 
of the action. 25 According to the Appeals Court, such procedural defects 
are jurisdictional only if the defendant can show actual resulting preju-
dice. 26 Absent such prejudice, the court is not automatically denied 
jurisdiction to hear the complaint. In determining whether the action 
should be allowed to proceed, the judge may consider the extent to 
which the defects have interfered with the achievement of the purposes 
implicit in the statutory scheme.27 Thus, the interests of both the zoning 
authority and "persons aggrieved" are afforded adequate protection. 
Twomey should not be interpreted, however, as giving a carte blanche 
to those who fail to comply with the provisions of section 17.28 In its 
decision, the Appeals Court distinguished its own prior decision of 
SURV. MASS. LAW, § 15.4, at 470, concluded made defects in procedure or notice 
jurisdictional. The Appeals Court's interpretation of the statute in the present case, 
however, indicates that the judicial attitude adopted with reference to § 21 of the 
Zoning Enabling Act has been adopted in its entirety with reference to § 17 of 
the new Zoning Act. Therefore, the aforementioned additional provision does not 
have the effect anticipated by this author. 
20 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1240, 390 N.E.2d at 274. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1240-41, 390 N.E.2d at 274 (citing Shaughnessy v. Board of Appeals 
of Lexington, 357 Mass. 9, 255 N.E.2d 367 (1970)). 
24 The list of other procedural defects that are not jurisdictional includes the 
failure to attach a copy of the board of appeals' decision to the copy of the com-
plaint served on the defendants or filed with the clerk and the failure to name 
the original applicant or a board member as a defendant, resulting in lack of 
service upon those parties. See Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Garver, 369 Mass. 
804, 809, 343 N.E.2d 412, 415 (1976). 
25 See 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1240, 390 N.E.2d at 274. 
26 See ill. at 1240-41, 390 N.E.2d at 274. 
27 See id. at 1240-42, 390 N.E.2d at 274-75. 
28 G.L. c. 40A, § 17, for text of statute, see note 2 supra. 
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Gurico v. RU8S0,29 in which the court affirmed a superior court judge's 
discretionary denial of a motion to amend a complaint so as to include 
all required defendants.3o The court emphasized that in Gurico, unlike 
Twomey, none of the defendants had even been given notice, timely 
or otherwise.31 This distinction suggests that in circumstances where 
the statutory requirements have never been met, a reviewing court will 
not upset the trial judge's dismissal of the complaint. Where the re-
quirements have been fulfilled, however, but were not timely or other-
wise procedurally accurate, Twomey implies that a reviewing court will 
examine the decision, and, unless the defendant has demonstrated ac-
tual prejudice to the satisfaction of the reviewing court, reinstate the 
complaint. 
§15.7. Zoning Appeals-The Scope of Judicial Review. Under the 
doctrine of Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable,1 the power 
of a reviewing court to reverse a local zoning board of appeals' denial, 
of an application for a variance or special permit is extremely limited. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has determined that a judge may exercise 
the power in only two situations: (1) when the variance or special 
permit was denied solely upon a legally untenable ground, and the 
board stated that the variance or special permit would have been 
granted but for that ground; or (2) when the decision not to grant the 
variance or special permit was "unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or 
arbitrary and so illegal." 2 Embodied in this doctrine is the general 
concept of the proper scope of judicial review of administrative deci-
sions: specifically, a reviewing court may not place itself in the position 
of the board of appeals. Since a reviewing court does not possess the 
same discretionary power as does an administrative agency, the court 
may not substitute its own judgment for that of the board. Despite the 
long history and continued vitality of the Pendergast doctrine, several 
cases 3 arose during the Survey year that tested the extent of the doc-
trine's application. 
29 3 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 326 N.E.2d 30 (1975). 
30 ld. at 730-31, 326 N.E.2d at 31-32. 
31 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1241, 390 N.E.2d at 275. 
§15.7. 1 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954), noted in Sacks & Curran, Ad-
ministrative Law, 1954 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.25, at 147-51. 
2 331 Mass. at 559-60, 120 N.E.2d at 919. 
3 Board of Selectmen of Stockbridge v. Monument Inn, Inc., 1979 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. 1561, 391 N.E.2d 1265; Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of 
Appeals of Canton, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2024, 395 N.E.2d 880; Geryk 
v. Zoning Appeals Bd. of Easthampton, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2277, 396 
N.E.2d 733; Board of Appeals of Dedham v. Corporation Tifereth Israel, 1979 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 332, 386 N.E.2d 772. 
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In two cases,4 the Appeals Court considered lower court decisions 
ordering the grant of a variance or special permit. In Subaru of New 
England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton," the plaintiff had applied 
for a special pennit to build a warehouse and office building on a 
parcel of land lying within a flood plain district. 6 Although the prop-
erty was zoned industrial, the Canton by-law prohibited the filling of 
land in the flood plain district except by special pennit.7 The zoning 
board denied the plaintiff's application on the ground that the proposed 
filling might adversely affect the flood control characteristics and water 
storage capacity of the district.s The trial judge, after an independent 
examination of the evidence, found that the effect of the proposed 
facility upon the water storage capacity would be minimal,9 He there-
fore ruled that the board had acted unreasonably and arbitrarily.10 
Accordingly, the judge ordered the board to issue the pennit.11 
On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed, holding that it is "the board's 
evaluation of the seriousness of the problem, not the judge's, which is 
controlling." 12 The court emphasized that the board's intended discre-
tion would be eliminated if a denial of a permit could be held to be 
arbitrary whenever the board, upon the facts found by the trial judge, 
could have issued the pennit,13 The court concluded that the board's 
concern for lost storage capacity and the danger of flooding was rea-
sonable, and therefore, that its decision must prevail.14 
In Geryk v. Zoning Appeals Board of Easthampton/5 the plaintiffs 
sought a variance which would have pennitted them to divide one lot 
into two lots, each of which would have been less than the prescribed 
minimum lot area. 16 The permit sought would also have pennitted the 
erection of a two-family house on one of the new lots in a district where 
two-family houses were not pennitted by right.17 The board of appeals 
4 Subaru of New England, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 1979 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2024, 395 N.E.2d 880; Geryk v. Zoning Appeals Bd. of East-
hampton, 1979 Mass. App. Gt. Adv. Sh. 2277, 396 N.E.2d 733. 
Ii 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2024, 395 N.E.2d 880. 
6 Id. at 2025, 395 N.E.2d at 881. 
7 Id. 
SId. at 2026, 395 N.E.2d at 881. 
9 Id. at 2058, 395 N.E.2d at 882. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2028, 395 N.E.2d at 881. 
12 Id. at 2030, 395 N.E.2d at 883 (quoting Copley v. Board of Appeals of 
Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 296 N.E.2d at 716 (1973». 
13 See id. at 2028-29, 395 N.E.2d at 882. 
14 Id. at 2030, 395 N.E.2d at 883. 
15 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2277, 396 N.E.2d 733. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 2277, 396 N.E.2d at 733-34. 
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denied the application. ls During the course of their appeal to the 
superior court, the plaintiffs opted to pursue a different variance, one 
which would have allowed them to locate one single-family residence 
on each undersized lot.19 Consequently, the trial judge annulled the 
board's decision and ordered it to grant a variance for the construction 
of two single-family houses.2o 
The Appeals Court reversed the judgment, stating that under section 
17 of chapter 40A21 of the General Laws a reviewing court does not 
have the power to reshape in this manner the relief originally sought 
from the board of appeals.22 After reviewing the Pendergast doctrine, 
the court concluded that "[b]y substituting fonns of relief different from 
those originally asked for, the court engages exactly in the sort of ad-
ministrative intervention which Pendergast warns against." 23 Con-
sequently, the court entered a judgment affinning the board's denial of 
the application.24 
These two decisions exemplify the extent of the protection afforded 
the decisions of local boards of appeals under the Pendergast doctrine. 
The application of the doctrine is not limited to situations in which the 
board of appeals had previously denied an application for a variance 
or special pennit, however. Two other Survey year decisions illustrate 
the full extent to which the doctrine protects local decisions against 
judicial intervention. 
In Board of Appeals of Dedham v. Corporation Tifereth Israel,25 the 
board of appeals had previously granted a special pennit upon condi-
tion that the applicant not use a particular private way for access to 
the property.26 The applicant's subsequent appeal to the board for re-
moval of the condition was denied.27 On appeal to the superior court, 
the trial judge, finding that there was no direct vehicular access to the 
property other than the private way, ruled that the board's decision to 
deny the applicant access from the private way was unreasonable.28 
18 ld. at 2277, 396 N.E.2d at 733. 
19 ld. at 2277, 396 N.E.2d at 734. 
20 ld. at 2278, 396 N.E.2d at 734. 
21 C.L. c. 40A, § 17, prOvides for judicial review of zoning board of appeals 
decisions. 
22 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2278, 396 N.E.2d at 734. 
23 ld. See Strand v. Planning Bd. of Sudbury, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 21-23, 358 
N.E.2d 842, 844-46 (1977). 
24 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2279, 396 N.E.2d at 734. 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 332, 386 N.E.2d 772. 
26 ld. at 332, 386 N.E.2d at 773. 
27 ]d.. 
28 ld. 
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Therefore, the judge annulled the condition imposed upon the permit, 
in effect ordering the grant of an unconditional permit.29 
The Appeals Court reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial 
judge had erred in removing the condition.3o According to the court, 
the Pendergast doctrine does not give the judge the power to order 
modifications of a permit. 31 The court, noting that the board was better 
equipped than a court to consider any modifications or changes of 
permits, stated, "It is for the board alone to determine whether a permit 
should be granted with or without the condition." 32 Accordingly, the 
court entered a judgment affirming the decision of the board.33 
The language of the court in Corporation Tifereth Israel should not 
be interpreted to mean that a judge may never order modification of a 
permit. A fourth Survey year case, Board of Selectmen of Stockbridge 
v. Monument Inn, Inc.,34 indicated one circumstance in which the Ap-
peals Court will uphold a trial judge's modification of a permit. In 
Monument Inn, a lower court judge, in a good faith effort to resolve a 
dispute concerning whether a special permit had been granted subject 
to conditions, affirmed the permit subject to eight conditions, none of 
which had been imposed by the board under its grant to the permit.35 
The Appeals Court, agreeing with both parties that the judge had erred 
in imposing conditions not part of the permit as originally granted, 
reversed the judgment and remanded the case of the superior COurt.36 
The court stated in dicta, however, that "[mJodification of a special 
permit by the court is permitted where it is clear from the record that 
29 See ld. The permit as originally granted was subject to the condition "that 
access to this property be from Boston only with no access prOVided from Ware 
Street." The judge amended the special permit by striking out the quoted lan-
guage. ld. 
30 See id. at 332-33, 386 N.E.2d at 773-74. 
31 ld. at 332, 386 N.E.2d at 774 (quoting Strand v. Planning Bd. of Sudbury, 
5 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 22, 158 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1977». 
32 ld. at 333, 386 N.E.2d at 774, (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Arpeals of 
Framingham, 355 Mass. 275,244 N.E.2d 311 (1969); Copley v. Board 0 Appeals 
of Canton, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 296 N.E.2d 716 (1973)). 
33 ld. 
34 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1561, 391 N.E.2d 1265. 
35 ld. at 1564, 1567, 391 N.E.2d at 1267, 1268. The dispute involved a lettN 
agreement between the board and certain abutters, which set forth restrictions upon 
the applicant's use of the property. The official notiR~tion to the. applicant ad-
vising that its application had been granted, however, did not speCifically refer to 
the letter or to the conditions state therein. The eight conditions imposed by the 
lower court judge were derived largely from "Recommendations" submitted by him 
at an earlier stage of the litigation. ld. at 1562-64 & n.5, 391 N.E.2d at 1266-67 & 
n.5. 391 N.E.2d at 1266-67 & n.5. 
36 ld. at 1566-69, 391 N.E.2d at 1267-69. 
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exactly the same ultimate result would occur from a remand as that 
effected by the decree." 37 
The situations in which modification is permitted under the Pender-
gast doctrine are perhaps best illustrated by a 1975 decision. In Chira 
v. Planning Board of Tisbury,38 a zoning board had granted special 
permits allowing a developer to construct attached and detached build-
ings on the locus. 39 A lower court judge, ruling that the board had 
exceeded its authority, entered decrees modifying the special permits 
accordingly.40 On appeal, the Appeals Court determined that the board 
had exceeded its authority under the applicable zoning laws by allowing 
the construction of attached buildings.41 The record clearly indicated, 
however, that the board had intended to authorized development within 
the fullest extent allowable under the zoning laws.42 Therefore, the 
court concluded that "no useful purpose would be served by a remand" 43 
and upheld modification by the lower court.44 
Chira establishes that a reviewing court judge need not mechanically 
remand cases to the zoning board when it is clear that modification of 
the permit by the court would produce precisely the same result. It is 
equally clear, however, that the judge may not substitute his own judg-
ment for that of the board as an element of that modification. The 
situation presented by Corporation Tifereth Israel illustrates this distinc-
tion. The lower court judge, finding that it was unreasonable to deny 
the applicant access from the private way, annulled the condition, in 
effect ordering the grant of an unconditional permit.411 Had he instead 
remanded the case to the zoning board, the permit may possibly have 
been granted subject to other conditions limiting the applicant's access 
from or use of the private way. It was clear from the record that the 
board did not wish to grant an unconditional permit.46 Therefore, by 
in effect ordering the grant of an unconditional permit, the judge sub-
stituted his own judgment for that of the board. Such modifications by 
a court, which effectively usurp the discretionary power of the zoning 
authority, are not permitted under the Pendergast doctrine. 
37 Id. at 1567, 391 N.E.2d at 1268 (quoting Chira v. Planning Bd. of Tisbury, 
3 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 440, 333 N.E.2d 204, 209 (1975)). 
38 3 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 333 N.E.2d 204 (1975). 
89 Id. at 434, 439, 333 N.E.2d at 206, 209. 
40 Id. at 439, 333 N.E.2d at 209. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. at 440, 333 N .E.2d at 209. 
48 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 332, 386 N.E.2d at 773. 
46 See id. 
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Analysis of these decisions indicates that a judge may modify the 
grant of a conditional permit only when he may order the grant of the 
permit itself. Consequently, the protection provided by the Pendergast 
doctrine extends to all decisions of the local zoning boards, thereby in-
suring that such boards will continue to retain their usual administrative 
discretion. As a result, as the above discussion demonstrates, anyone 
seeking to overturn a zoning board decision in a variance' or special 
permit case faces a difficult task. 
§15.8. Eminent Domain-Assessment of Damages. One of the most 
frequently litigated issues in eminent domain cases involves the deter-
mination of the amount of damages the ·taking authority must pay to 
the landowner. In the commonwealth, the amount of the award must 
be determined by applying an objective standard: the owner of the land 
is entitled to recover its fair market value considered in light of the 
"highest and best use to which the land could reasonably be put." 1 
This traditional standard frequently raises issues concerning the admis-
sibility of certain evidence used by the fact finder to arrive at the 
property's fair market value. During the 1979 Survey year, two cases 2 
dealt with this aspect of the damages issue. 
In Roach v. Newton Redevelopment Authority,S the plaintiff owned 
seven parcels of land that were taken by the defendant Redevelopment 
Authority as part of its urban renewal program.4 The parcels had been 
acquired by the plaintiff at various times. All but one were zoned for 
single-family residential use.5 The one parcel not so zoned remained 
unzoned at the time of the taking.6 At the non-jury trial, the plaintiff 
contended that the highest and best use of the property was for com-
mercial uses.7 In support of this contention, evidence was introduced 
tending to show both that the land was suitable for commercial use 
and that a private owner could obtain rezoning for such use.8 The 
§15.8. 1 Colonial Acres, Inc. v. Town of North Reading, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 
386, 331 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1975), noted in Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1975 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, § 19.20, at 555; Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
362 Mass. 684, 685, 290 N.E.2d 160, 161 (1972). 
2 Roach v. Newton Redev. Auth., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2197, 396 
N.E.2d 170; Ux v. Town of North Reading, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 268, 398 N.E.2d 489. 
3 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2197, 396 N.E.2d 170. 
4 See id. at 2197, 2198, 2200, 396 N.E.2d at 172, 173, 174. 
1\ Id. at 2198, 396 N.E.2d at 173. 
6 Id. at n.3. 
7 Id. at 2199, 396 N.E.2d at 173. 
8 Id. at 2198-2200, 396 N.E.2d at 173-74. The relevant evidence presented by 
the plaintiff included proof that the parcels had been assembled for development, 
that existing buildings had been removed, that the site had been leveled and graded, 
that necessary utilities were proximate and available, that public transportation was 
nearby and accessible, and that there had been much commercial development in 
the immediate vicinity, a large part of which involved changes in zoning classifica-
tions. Id.at 2198, 396 N.E.2d at 173. 
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evidence also indicated that some of the land had been so rezoned after 
the takings, upon petitions filed by the defendant.9 Based upon the 
evidence produced, the judge at the non-jury trial found that the highest 
and best use of the plaintiff's land would be for commercial uses, that 
it was reasonably probable that a private developer could obtain a zon-
ing change to permit such uses, and that the defendant had subsequently 
obtained such a zoning change and had utilized the land for commercial 
purposes. lO Damages were assessed accordingly.n At the subsequent 
jury trial, the findings from the non-jury case were introduced into 
evidence and read to the jury by the trial judge,12 The plaintiff also 
introduced evidence that other commercial zoning changes in the im-
mediate area had been allowed within a reasonable time prior to the 
taking.13 The trial judge, however, excluded the plaintifFs offer of 
evidence concerning the post-taking rezoning.14 At the conclusion of 
the trial, the jury assessed damages consistent with the findings of the 
judge at the non-jury trial,15 The defendant appealed, claiming that 
the judge in the non-jury trial erred in admitting evidence of the sub-
sequent zoning change. He claimed that this error was in turn reflected 
in the jury's verdict.16 
The Appeals Court, in upholding the jury's verdict,17 first considered 
whether evidence of the zoning change could be admissible at all as 
bearing upon the value of the land. The court noted that "[t]he fact 
that a potential use is prohibited by the zoning law at the time of the 
taking does not preclude its consideration." 18 The court required only 
that the granting of the prohibited use not be unduly speculative.19 
The court observed that the trial judge has a margin of discretion in 
determining whether there is sufficient proof to warrant consideration 
of the issue by the trier of fact. 2Q In this instance, the court was satis-
9 ld. at 2200, 396 N.E.2d at 174. 
10 ld. at 2200-01, 396 N.E.2d at 174. 
11 Damages were assessed in the amount of $559,481. ld. at 2201, 396 N.E.2d 
at 174. 
12 ld. at 2201 & n.9, 396 N.E.2d at 174-75 & n.9. 
18 ld. at 2201, 396 N.E.2d at 175. 
14 ld. at 2202, 396 N.E.2d at 175. 
15 See id. Although consistent with the finding that the highest and best use of 
the property was for commercial uses, the jury assessed damages in the amount 
of $1,186,101, more than double that assessed by the judge in the non-jury trial. 
ld. at 2202, 396 N.E.2d at 175. 
16 See id. at 2198, 396 N.E.2d at 173. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. at 2202,396 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Lee v. Commonwealth, 361 Mass. 864, 
281 N.E.2d 239 (1972); Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 81-82, 138 
N.E.2d 609, 611-12 (1956». 
19 ld. 
20 ld. (citing Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 684, 687, 290 
N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972». 
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fied that the evidence established sufficient probability that a private 
developer could have the property rezoned to permit the judge to allow 
consideration of that issue.21 Moreover, the court indicated that, even 
apart from the disputed evidence, proof of considerable commercial de-
velopment nearby was sufficient to permit a judge in his discretion to 
allow the prospect of a zone change to be considered as bearing on the 
value of the land taken.22 
After determining that evidence of the likelihood of a zoning change 
was admissible, the court turned to the question of whether it could 
admit evidence that the defendant, after the taking, had petitioned for 
and received a zoning change.23 The court acknowledged the general 
rule that an actual zoning change which occurs as a result of the project 
for which the property is taken should not be considered in valuing the 
property.24 The court recognized, however, that proof of a zoning 
change subsequent to the taking is "significant evidence of the existence 
at the time of the taking of a reasonable probability of change." 25 In 
the court's view, the critical issue in Roach was whether the judge could 
reasonably find that there was a likelihood that a private developer, as 
well as the taking authOrity, could have obtained the rezoning.26 If 
such was the case, the court ruled, the judge could admit such evidence 
as additional proof of "a reasonable prospect of change bearing on 
value." 27 The court concluded that sufficient proof had been offered 
to support the judge's decision to admit the evidence of the zoning 
change.28 
The court also ruled that the trial judge'S treatment of the issue at 
the jury trial constituted an independent basis for upholding the ver-
dict. 29 The court emphasized that the issue of the probability of a 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 2203,396 N.E.2d at 175 (citing Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
362 Mass. 684, 688, 290 N.E.2d 160, 163 (1972». 
23 ld. at 2203, 396 N.E.2d at 176. 
24 ld. at 2204, 396 N.E.2d at 176. The Court considered the question to be 
one of first impresSion, as no Massachusetts decision directly on point had been 
brought to their attention. ld. The Court found persuasive authority, however, 
in the logic of decisions close on point and in authority from other sources. ld. See, 
e.g., Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 665-66, 157 N.E.2d 209,212 (1959); 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 263, 96 N.E. 666, 668 (1911); May v. 
Boston, 158 Mass. 21,29, 32 N.E. 902, 904 (1893); State v. Kruger, 77 Wash. 2d 
105,459 P.2d 648 (1969); 4 NICHOLS' EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.322(1) (rev. 3d ed. 
1980) and authorities cited in n.7.1 at 12-655; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 320-23 
(1966). 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2204-05, 396 N.E.2d at 176. 
26 ld. at 2205,396 N.E.2d at 176. See 4 NICHOLS' EMINENT DoMAIN § 12.322.(2) 
(rev. 3d ed. 1980).· 
27 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2205, 396 N.E.2d at 176-77. 
28 ld. at 2205, 396 N.E.2d at 177. 
29 ld. at 2206, 396 N.E.2<l at 177. 
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private developer obtaining rezoning was submitted to the jury by way 
of a special question. Thus, the jury's attention was confined solely to 
this issue.3o The trial judge's instructions to the jury contained no 
reference to the disputed finding on the defendant's rezoning, and the 
jury was specifically instructed that they could not consider any activity 
pertaining to the urban renewal project.31 Consequently, since the 
defendant did not object to the instructions on the zoning question or 
on the weight to be given the non-jury findings, the Appeals Court ruled 
that the introduction of such findings into evidence did not constitute 
reversible error. S2 
In the second Survey year case concerning the assessment of damages 
for eminent domain takings, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Ux v. Town 
of North Reading,SS found that the exclusion of certain evidence did 
constitute reversible error.34 At the jury trial, the plaintiff's expert wit-
ness testified that the highest and best use of the land taken was for 
a subdivision into three single-family lots. As such, the value of the 
land was $54,427.811 The witness further testified that in the event that 
the land could not be subdivided, it would have a value of $32,250 as a 
single residential lot.36 The defendant town introduced the testimony 
of two experts, one of whom valued the land at $6,500 and the other 
at $9,200.37 The town sought to prove that the soil conditions prevented 
use of the land for residential purposes. For this purpose, it sought to 
introduce into evidence two maps, one a "Geological Survey Map" and 
the other a "Soil Conservation Map," both of which were incorporated 
into the town's zoning by-Iaw.ss The maps showed the soil conditions 
of the area, including wetlands areas and out-croppings of ledge in the 
town.39 The trial judge refused to admit either map into evidence.4o 
The judge also refused to admit the town planning board's "Rules and 
Regulations Governing the Subdivision of the Land." 41 The defend-
ant claimed that these regulations were relevant to determining whether 
planning board approval was required for subdivision.42 The jury re-
turned a verdict of $25,000 in damages, and the town appealed.48 
30Id. 
31 Id. at 2206-07, 396 N.E.2d at 177. 
32 Id. at 2207-08, 396 N.E.2d at 177-78. 
33 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2681, 398 N.E.2d 489. 
34 Id. at 2682, 398 N.E.2d at 490. 
811 Id. at 2681, 398 N.E.2d at 490. 
86Id. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89 Id. 
40Id. 
41 Id. at 2683, 398 N.E.2d at 491. 
42Id. 
43 Id. at 2681, 398 N.E.2d at 490. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that it was 
error for the trial judge to have refused to admit into evidence the 
maps and the planning board regulations.44 The Court observed first 
that the suitability of the plaintiffs land for residential development 
was a legitimate matter of inquiry at the tria1.45 It then noted that the 
presence of wetland or ledge on or near the parcel might affect the 
suitability of the land for residential purposes and, therefore, might bear 
on the value of the land.46 The Court reasoned that the two maps, if 
properly authenticated, would be admissible to show that all or part of 
the land was not suitable for residential purposes.47 Similarly, the Court 
held that the exclusion of the town planning board's "Rules and Regula-
tions Governing the Subdivision of Land" was erroneous.48 During the 
trial, an issue had arisen concerning whether subdivision of the parcel 
into three lots would require planning board approva1.49 Section 81L 
of chapter 41 of the General Laws states that planning board approval 
is not required for subdivision when each resulting lot would front on 
a public way, on a way shown on a plan previously approved under the 
subdivision control law, or on "( c) a way in existence when the sub-
division control law became effective in the . . . town in which the 
land lies." 1i0 The issue of whether the plaintiff's plan required planning 
board approval turned. upon whether a way near the parcel fell within 
the language of clause (c)) quoted above.51 The Court noted that by 
the terms of clause (c), the decision whether the road fell within 
the clause's language was vested in the planning board in the first in-
stance. Thus, it concluded that the board's rules and regulations gov-
erning the subject were relevant, material evidence and should have 
been admitted. 52 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the judge, 
by apparently assuming that a division of the parcel would not require 
approval, had deprived the town of an opportunity to present evidence 
which, if believed, would permit the fact finder to reach the contrary 
conclusion.1i3 Hence, the Court concluded that the maps and the plan-
ning board regulations should have been admitted to aid in determining 
the value of the land taken. 
44 ld. at 2682, 2683, 398 N.E.2d at 490, 491. 
46 ld. at 2682, 398 N.E.2d at 490. 
461d. 
47 ld. 
48 ld. at 2683, 398 N.E.2d at 491. 
49 ld. at 2682, 398 N.E.2d at 491. C.L. c. 41, § 81L, prOvides that the division 
of a parcel of land into two or more lots constitutes a "subdivision" and consequently 
must have planning board approval, unless certain specified conditions exist. ld. 
50 C.L. c. 41, § 81L. 
lil 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2682, 398 N.E.2d at 491. 
1i2 ld. at 2682-83, 398 N.E.2d at 491. 
liS ld. at 2683, 398 N .E.2d at 491. 
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